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Chapter 15

Making Reparations Possible:
Theorizing Reparative Justice
Margaret Urban Walker

To hold that redressing a wrong is an obligation of justice is to hold that some remedial action is
(at least prima facie) necessary, something that morally must be done. The requirements of justice
are usually understood to be ones that we are required to meet in all cases in which practical
circumstances are not so dire or chaotic as to prevent our performance, and in which no other
obligations of comparable gravity or urgency conflict. It is curious, then, how often arguments
in recent theoretical literature on reparations for massive violence and abuse aim to show that
reparations are impossible (or nearly impossible)-logically, morally, or practically-to make.
Some claim to show that, regrettably, the very worst among actual injustices-atrocity, genocide,
slavery, dispossession, and the like-are ones for which just repair is simply impossible. Yet these
are the very cases for which we invoke the concept of reparations.
The absence of theory concerning justice in repair is curious as well. Despite vast and varied
theoretical literatures on distributive and retributive justice, with competing positions grounded
in philosophical commitments and tested by practical implications, the contemporary theoretical
literature on reparative justice remains relatively slight. To begin with (and not inconsequentially),
there is no uniformly agreed-upon terminology for the kind of justice in question. While many
authors speak of corrective or (in an older tradition) commutative justice, others speak of
compensatory, rectificatory, reparatory, or reparative justice, without clarification about whether
these are labels for the same kind of theory or principle. There is relatively little in the way of
genuine theories of reparative justice. Instead, many writers assume or invoke some version of
the principle that justice requires a victim of wrongdoing to be returned by the wrongdoer to the
state the victim enjoyed prior to, or would have enjoyed in the absence of, the wrong. This is,
of course, Aristotle's conception of commutative (or corrective) justice. But whatever luster of
authority that philosophical pedigree imparts to corrective justice, its more immediate referent
is legal practice concerning remedies for unjust harms and losses, where responsible parties are
required to make restitution to wronged individuals, or pay them compensation in proportion to
harm or loss, in cases of tort or breach of contract. The principle of corrective justice is for the party
at fault to restore the prior condition of the wronged party as nearly as possible by wiping out the
consequences of the wrong.
To illustrate the poverty of such narrow thinking about reparative justice, I begin with a number
of arguments in very recent theoretical writing on reparations that aim to show that justice in repair
is defective or deceptive, where it is possible at all. I call them "impossibility arguments." They
share the assumption that justice in repair is identical to or exhausted by corrective justice: justice
in repair consists in cancelling out or reversing wrongful harms, typically by means of restitution
or proportionate compensation. I propose that we see impossibility arguments, resting on the
corrective justice premise, as reductio arguments: if reparations are necessary as obligations of
justice, they must typically be possible; if certain assumptions about the nature of reparative justice
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make them (nearly or commonly) impossible, then those assumptions must be incorrect. Reliance
on the corrective justice assumption represents a failure to pursue an adequate theory of (what I
will call) 'reparative justice', the broadest genus of justice in repair. A theory of reparative justice
must expose its core concerns, guiding aims, and implications in practice. A useful theory would
also identifY the specific challenges and limits, including sources of resistance, to justice in repair.
I will offer in broad outline an account of the nature and guiding aim of reparative justice. My
view takes as a reference point the new contemporary practice of political reparations for mass
violence and systemic human rights abuse that emerged in the mid-twentieth century. This nascent
practice, I will argue below, is an important reference point for the theory of reparative justice. It
has resulted (and will no doubt continue to develop) through tests and struggles that can be seen
as a set of experiments in discovering what constitutes and signifies justice in repair, however
imperfect, for massive human rights crimes. An adequate account of reparative justice ought
not only to cohere with but to explain prominent features of this new practice, especially for my
purposes here, the diversity of measures that embody justice in repair. Finally, corrective justice
ought to find a place within this broader account; I think it can be seen as one implementation of
reparative justice within a certain institutional framework under certain political conditions.

Impossibility Arguments

A surprising number of current arguments concerning reparations for mass violence and political
repression aim to show that reparative justice is impossible or irrelevant. A number of very recent
papers illustrate common ways of thinking about reparative justice that result in impossibility
arguments (Du Plessis and Pete 2007; Williams et al. 2012). Some arguments aim to deflate or
abuse the idea of corrective justice in response to massive harms while others aim to displace the
application of reparative justice in favor of "prospective," "forwarding looking," or distributive
justice. All of these arguments assume that justice in repair of wrongs is corrective justice, so
whether the standard of corrective justice is fulfilled determines whether reparations, envisioned
or made, are true, real, "first-best," adequate, serious, or meaningful as attempts at justice. The
conclusion in various versions is that reparations are doomed to inadequacy; in the benign case
they fail at doing justice while in the worst case they impede justice or violate it.
Gary Bass argues that reparations are at best a "noble lie," since atrocity or genocide "cannot be
undone" and compensation for such crimes "can never be adequate if measured against the depth of
the wound" (Bass 2012: 167 and 171 ). Bass places reparations in parallel to war crimes tribunals,
calling reparations a kind of war tort. By the corrective justice standard of "normal tort law" ( 169)
that requires compensation in proportion to injury, reparations cannot be other than a "tokenistic
measure ... to mollifY the victims ... " (167). While he recognizes that in some cases victims seek
admissions and apologies instead of or in addition to compensation, justice demands proportionate
compensation (171 ). This argument may seem simplistic, but I have heard versions of it on many
occasions in discussion: reparations are inherently wrong-headed or incoherent because we cannot
change the past or undo what has been done. It is worth remarking this kind of argument, not only
for its equation of money payments with "real" justice, but because it is problematic in two other
ways. No one is more acutely aware than victims of grave wrongs that there is no undoing many
of them; what they seek as reparations can hardly be that. On the other hand, in some cases what
has happened in the past may indeed be "undone" and is exactly what victims seek: return of land,
restoration of rights and status, or the correction of false history.
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Jon Elster, in the same volume, shares the idea that only material reparations are real
reparations. But while Bass sees symbolic gestures as noble, or at least kindly, Elster scorns them.
In the aftermath of widespread abuses, he argues, there are demands of distributive, retributive,
restitutive, and compensatory justice to be met (Elster 2012: 80). When it comes to reparations,
"Unless governments are willing to put their money where their mouth is," it is nothing but "cheap
talk," including official apologies, which are likely to be "meaningless," "absurd," or "empty"
(86). If, on the other hand, governments do fund reparations, they might unjustly "punish" nonvictims or collateral victims if reparations draw resources away from compelling distributive
justice demands (92-3). In any case, "full reparation at a large scale may be economically
unfeasible" (93). Reparations, seen as corrective compensation, are probably unwise if not unjust,
and often impossible.
Adrian Vermeule also assumes that reparation means compensation and that corrective
compensation in reparations is chronically inadequate. But it is no more "disastrously unprincipled"
than the ordinary legal system of corrective justice (Vermeule 2012: 163). In many such cases,
Vermeule argues, inadequate and non-individuated compensation fails to satisfy justice but responds
to an unprincipled sense of"roughjustice," an intuition that some compensation is better than none
at all (151 ). While reparations are "indefensible on any plausible first-best criterion of justice," and
although there may be problems of unequal treatment among the compensated, and between the
compensated and the uncompensated, this second-best is not more objectionable than what goes
on in ordinary corrective justice. Vermeule thus defends reparations, but not because it answers
to any principled idea or conception of justice appropriate to its own aims and demands. In other
words, to say that it is rough justice is to say it's not really justice at all, and to say that arbitrary
compensation is better than none at all suggests that compensation, and only compensation, is at
issue in the justice of repair.
Other arguments claim that reparations are not really best understood as an exercise of
backward-looking justice at all, or that if they are so understood, they are superseded or preempted
by forward-looking distributive justice demands. These arguments say, in effect, that if we seek
justice in addressing wrongs we should adopt forward-looking or distributive justice as our guide
(see also Wenar 2006 and Pierik 2006).
Writing on expropriated land in former communist countries, Christopher Kutz argues that
corrective justice is a distinct and valid normative ground for justice in repair, and one that
embodies ideals of accountability, but it is often "the wrong framework for considering reparative
claims" (Kutz 2004: 302). Because corrective justice rectifies wrongful invasions of entitlements it
is dependent for its force on a distributively just scheme of entitlements (297). As a consequence,
a state has "no business" meeting reparations claims in those cases where it is unable to ensure
minimally adequate standards of living generally (301). Applied generally, Kutz's claim for the
priority of distributive justice would put material reparations-and possibly symbolic ones that
too have their cost--out of bounds in most cases. Given the serious distributive injustice of most
societies even by minimal standards, limited resources should be put to the more fundamental
work of distributive justice. If there is an argument for return of expropriated land, he argues, that
argument will be one of distributive justice, where a group is entitled to its land as a condition of
continuing its tradition and culture (31 0). Kutz sees the reparative value of symbolic recognition,
including symbolic monetary payments, as acknowledgment of "the legal and moral subjectivity
of the victims" (284). But he seems to see these as forward-looking questions of national identity
being reconstructed or transformed (281-3). It is unclear what space is left in his scheme for a
kind of reparative justice-neither corrective nor retributive-that grounds independent claims of
redress for victims of specific grievous wrongs in the past.
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Jeremy Webber argues that reparations (and other transitional justice measures) are often about
"prospective justice" that seeks to bring parties into relationship on a just foundation for the future
(Webber 2012: 104). Retrospective corrective justice, on the other hand, involves a "narrow optic"
that simply seeks to reverse a wrongful transaction without addressing broader questions (121 ).
Even payment often functions symbolically, as an "earnest" to lend weight to apologies or other
measures that look forward to better future relations. ( 105). While reparations programs can partake
of both backward-looking corrective compensation of individuals and constructively forwardlooking reconstruction of relationships, these forms of justice operate by "very different logics"
( 107). They pose choices, and potentially dilemmas, about whether "to focus on the nature of past
wrongs" or "to manage parties' relations from here on" (108). So, where Kutz finds a dependency
of corrective justice on distributive justice, Webber finds a tension between two independent and
competing principles.
Webber illustrates this claim with the case of indigenous peoples, who may seek redress
through actual land restitution but also seek to reconstitute their relationship through prospective
claims to greater resources and autonomy (111-12). Indeed, Webber points out, they might be
willing to forego retrospective remedies to secure self-determination (112). While this claim about
some indigenous peoples might be correct, it establishes only that cases of profound, multifaceted,
extended, and deeply destructive histories of relationship between people or peoples may give
rise to multiple justice claims of distinct types that compete for resources, practical priority, and
political traction. What it does not show is that reparative justice is exhausted by corrective justice
and its modes of redress for the past are confined to that "narrow optic" of reversing an unjust
transaction. If corrective justice alone redresses the past, then where corrective justice cannot be
done the past cannot be the focus ofjustice, and justice claims must look to the future instead. What
:s missing is an examination of diverse ways, beyond corrective justice, that reparative justice can
' ngage the past and attempt redress. In the choice between past and future, the actual scene of
eparations struggles-the present-is not in view.
While Kutz has corrective and distributive justice as distinct normative principles with a
[
riority ordering, and Webber sees them as principles with divergent temporal orientations that
can be in tension, Michael Freeman sees corrective justice as a proper part of distributive justice,
because it "specifies rightful (re)distribution" (Freeman 2012: 39). Surprisingly, however, Freeman
argues that the focus on rectifYing past wrongs makes reparative justice "conceptually distinct" and
its claims possibly incompatible with distributive justice, especially in cases of historical injustice
(14). The claim that reparative justice is a part of distributive justice, however, turns out to be no
more than nominal, for reparative justice for Freeman is simply corrective justice, expressed in the
principle, "If A wrongfully harms B, then in the absence of overriding considerations, A should
compensate B for the wrong" (29); or, more concisely, "The first principle of reparative justice is
that the wrongdoer pays" (39). Freeman rehearses many familiar objections to reparative justice so
conceived. His paper ends, however, with the acknowledgment that "We have no comprehensive
and integrated theory of reparative justice" (50). Given this, one wonders why Freeman is sure
what its first principle is. In any case, he concludes that " ... the more difficult it is to achieve
reparative justice, the more it should be dominated by distributive justice" (49).
Current impossibility arguments echo a famous prototype, Jeremy Waldron's argument that
claims for repair of historical injustices such as land theft are likely to be "superseded" by present
and future distributive claims. Waldron says, " ... it is the impulse to justice now that should lead
the way in this process, not the reparation of something whose wrongness is understood primarily
in relation to conditions that no longer obtain" (Waldron 1992: 27). In variations on a theme,
current impossibility arguments purport to show that what is done as reparations is deceptive or
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wrong-headed; that it is merely "symbolic" in a deflationary sense; that what might be done is
actually a different kind of justice, something other than justice, or something contrary to justice;
or that reparative justice should be left aside in favor of another kind of justice. Most of all, it looks
in the wrong direction, to an inert and unrecoverable past.
I don't mean to suggest that there are no constructive arguments concerning reparations that are
rooted in a corrective justice approach (see Winter 2006 and 2014, Bernstein 2009, and Sammons
2012 for diverse examples). Yet many have argued that a "juridical," or "tort," or "corrective justice"
model is often inadequate or unhelpful applied precisely to the kinds of cases that reparations
are meant to address, including mass violence in conflict, genocide and crimes against humanity,
systemic gross human rights violations, severe political repression, or extreme intergenerational
injustices with long histories (Thompson 2002; Brooks 2004; De Greiff 2006b; Walker 2006a;
Yamamoto et al. 2007; Satz 2007; Verdeja 2007; Gray 201 Oa; Philpott 2012). Here I add the point
that corrective justice not only fails to guide understanding or action in many such cases, but can
function affirmatively as a lever to deflect, demote, or dismiss reparations claims as hopeless,
wrong-headed, or destructive. Impossibility arguments serve a kind of reparations skepticism at
a time when a distinctive new global practice and "reparations ethos" has been taking form (Falk
2006: 485; see also Barkan 2000).

A New Practice of Reparations
If we think that reparations for these massive and complex wrongs are indeed a requirement of
justice, we need alternative ways of theorizing the concerns, aims, and measures of reparative
justice. In doing so, I believe we should study the new practice of reparations that emerged in the
later twentieth century, a practice that has been shaped by activities by and on behalf of victims
of human rights violations and historical injustice around the globe. The multiform character of
reparations in this new practice sets a task for the theory of reparative justice: to understand what
are the underlying concerns that explain the complexity and diversity of reparations.
It is widely agreed that the payment of reparations by West Germany to individual survivors of
the Holocaust after WWII introduced a genuinely new practice, treating individuals, and not only
nations, as the subjects of claims against states for reparations for grave violations (Colonomos
2006). Extensive programs of reparations for victims and families were instituted in waves in
the aftermath of brutal military governments in Latin American countries, especially Chile and
Argentina, that engaged in repression, torture, disappearance, and illegal detention of their citizens.
The United States legislated a reparations program in 1988 for Japanese-Americans interned
during the World War Two, over 40 years after the events. After two decades of study, the United
Nations General Assembly in 2005 endorsed the "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations oflnternational Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" distilling a set of measures for making full
and effective reparation, understood as a human right in the case of severe abuses (United Nations
2006). The Basic Principles did not invent this new practice of reparations. It has developed out
of popular and civil society movements representing the needs and expectations of victims and
their societies as well as the work of domestic and international institutions. The Basic Principles
consolidated a wide-ranging and accelerating set of developments in many places: actual programs
of reparations; recommendations of appropriate reparations by truth commissions; decisions by
international courts (especially the Inter-American Court of Human Rights); reparations by private
entities; reparations proposals and demands by NGOs and victim advocacy groups; domestic and
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international lawsuits seeking compensation; and legal and academic scholarship (see De Greiff
2006; Johnston and Slyomovics 2009; Du Plessis and Pete 2007).
Section IX of the Basic Principles stress five categories of reparations measures. The first two
are the familiar ones of restitution, interpreted broadly to include liberty, legal standing, residence,
citizenship, and employment, and compensation for both economically assessable and moral
damage. A third is medical, psychological, social, and legal rehabilitation services. The last two
categories involve very diverse interventions. Satisfaction includes eight distinct measures: to
stop ongoing violations; to verify and disclose the truth publicly; to search for and rebury those
disappeared or abducted; to officially declare the reputation and rights of victims; to apologize
publicly; to sanction responsible parties administratively or judicially; to commemorate and
honor victims; and to include an accurate account of violations in educational materials. The final
category, guarantees ofnon-repetition, includes various preventive measures including institutional
reforms: an independent judiciary; due process guarantees; civilian control of the military; training
and education of public officials; monitoring; and institutional and legal reforms. These are all
measures that have been recommended repeatedly in truth commission reports and are increasingly
ordered by some international courts (Schonsteiner 2007).
I want to call attention to three features of the practice described. First, the Basic Principles are
addressed to states, and state responsibility for reparations is assumed. Several kinds of measures
mentioned can only be provided by state institutions. Where other persons or entities are liable, they
should provide reparations; if other liable parties are unable or unwilling, states should establish
national programs. Second, the Principles expressly recognize that victimization of individual
persons may also be directed against groups of persons who are targeted collectively, and that states
should develop procedures to allow groups of victims to pursue reparations. These two features
are not my principal concern here, but they suggest significant dimensions in which the corrective
justice model-with its individualized picture of injury and liability to compensate-does not
capture or explain distinctive features of the practice.
It is the third feature I want to emphasize here. The Basic Principles do not rank the different
categories of reparations measures. Restitution and compensation are paradigmatic legal remedies,
but practice has revealed that acknowledgment, responsibility-taking, truth telling, apology, and
memorialization, as well as credible guarantees of non-repetition, often tum out to be foremost
in importance to individuals and groups who have suffered human rights abuses (in contrast, for
interstate remedies, see Shelton 2002). The common distinction between "material" and "symbolic"
reparations, while useful for some purposes, can be very misleading here. A symbol or symbolic
gesture is what stands in for or represents something else that is absent or only indicated. To call
some reparations-such as apologies, truth telling, or commemoration-"symbolic" is to imply
that they are not the real thing. Yet one thing learned in contemporary reparations attempts is how
essential it is to victims of wrongs that money be accompanied by, or be part of, truth telling,
responsibility-taking, and gestures of respect toward victims. Even where it is necessary, money is
not sufficient (see Hamber 2009 and Mazurana et al. 2013). Money may be refused or understood
as insulting in the absence of honest accountability, respectful recognition, and clear admission
of wrongs. The "materiaVsymbolic" distinction also fails to capture the concrete but expressive
role played by preventive reforms. To undertake major change in societal institutions is costly in
money as well as social and political capital; but as part of a program of reparations it also sends to
victims and to society at large the message that what happened to the victims is simply intolerable
and cannot be allowed to happen again.
The diversity of measures that constitute reparations is striking; these measures recognize,
respect, enable, and support victims not only materially, but psychologically, legally, civically, and
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politically. Restitution and compensation have a central role, and in many cases there can be no
substitute for material redress. But there are other essential dimensions of reparations, including
gestures and actions that dignify and empower victims and that stress a societal commitment to
structural reform so that the suffering of victims is not repeated. While some of these reparative
measures could in principle be implemented by individuals responsible for wrongs, most of them
are or entail societal responsibilities for publicly communicating the dignity and deservingness of
victims and society's obligation to create the conditions in which victims can not only deal with
their injuries but continue their lives as full civil and political actors. These measures thus address
a problem larger than discrete injury; they recognize a problem of social and political standing that
may be both a cause and a result of gross violations. A theory of reparative justice should try to
illuminate what the multiform reparations agenda is seeking to address.

Rethinking Reparative Justice
Several new approaches in theorizing reparative justice have emerged. They have in common a
focus on the roles of reparations (and other post-conflict or transitional measures) in reconfiguring
or reconstituting the flawed moral and political relationships that invite abuses and are revealed
by the specific forms abuses take. The point is not restoring the status quo ante but affirming a
new baseline for moral and political engagement going forward. These accounts are not uncritical
concerning reparations efforts; they offer normative perspectives from which reparations attempts
can be found more or less apt or adequate. They are not skeptical of the project of reparations
as such; instead, they are prompted by new and diverse forms of reparations and by renewed
attention to questions ofhistorical injustice. Many of these theories see reparations as establishing
new relationships of recognition, trust, equality, respect, atonement, or reconciliation (on civic
recognition and trust, see De Greiff 2006b; on relations of respect and reciprocity, see Thompson
2002, Satz 2007, Verdeja 2007, and Murphy 2010). The central idea of my own view is that
reparations are about demonstrating (rather than establishing) relations of accountability and
reciprocity that no process or program of reparations can itself guarantee. Reparations are a
medium for the contentious yet hopeful negotiation in the present of proper recognition of the past
and proper terms of relation for the future. As such they require mutually reinforcing commitments
in multiple registers of relationship: money, acknowledgment, public ritual, social change.
Corrective justice-the idea that one party or group can hold another to account for wrongful
harm suffered, can pose terms of restitution or compensation, and can seek a resolution in that
way-presupposes that parties stand in relations of effective accountability and reciprocity, and
can activate these relations through institutional channels when they seek correction or redress.
Where, for example, a legal system gives its citizens rights to a remedy for unjust harms or losses
they have suffered and where citizens in fact have access to the institutions that can provide or
enforce those remedies, corrective justice describes one standard implementation of justice
in repair. Even in societies that provide this legal avenue, however, not all citizens may have
equal access to these institutions and some may have none. Some citizens may not have reason
to expect a fair hearing or may find that a legal system that historically permitted or enforced
their oppression, dispossession, or subordination now sets terms for remedies that disqualify their
claims, as unsuccessful legal actions by African-Americans for corporate reparations have found
(Brophy 2006 and Sammons 2012). Yet it is the absence of precisely these relations that lies at the
root of many of the profound harms and gross abuses where reparations are sought. Relationships
of accountability and reciprocity may not have obtained at the root historically, as in the case
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of chattel slavery in the United States and its aftermaths of segregation, domination, and racial
violence. They might have been inconsistent and fragile, as in the case of treaties and alliances
made with indigenous peoples and then quickly and willfully discarded for conquest, genocide,
and dispossession. They might be shallowly or selectively functional until historical resentments,
current power struggles, or competition for resources gives political opportunists an opening with
violent consequences, as in Germany in the 1930s, or in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda in
the 1990s. The details in all their variety are crucial for reparations in any particular case. But
a common factor is that reparations typically seek repair in a context where accountability and
reciprocity themselves are at issue (Walker 2014).
Accountability is the relationship in which we see each other as answerable to each other under
some common standards-whether I can reprimand you for your table manners, or insist on an
apology for your lack of consideration, or take you to court for a breach of contract. Accountability
relations can take formal legal or institutional forms, but upholding common standards of any
kind-from etiquette to human rights-requires accountability between us. If you have the power
to be unmoved by my demands, to be indifferent to the harms you cause me, or even to retaliate
against me for presuming that I can hold you to account, we do not stand in this most basic moral
and social relations. And if I have the privilege of assuming that what goes for me need not go
for you-that I deserve protection but you deserve none; that I can demand your respect, but
you may not expect mine-we are not in a relationship of reciprocity at some level, perhaps
even at the level of human decency. It is the absence of accountability and reciprocity that lies
at the root of the kinds of gross violations and profound harms to which programs of reparations
respond. I suggest that signifying the possibility of a relationship ofaccountability and reciprocity
where there has been none, or where it has been dangerously unreliable, is the fundamental task
of reparations-to which all its varied measures are a means. In some cases substantial material
restitution or compensation will be indispensable but it will never by itself be enough unless it is
accompanied by other measures that signify clear acknowledgment, responsibility, and the intent to
do justice (Walker 2013 ). This is something we can begin to see in the new practice of reparations.
It is also visible in a spreading rejection of the corrective justice or "tort model" of reparations
and in the emergence of related but contending accounts of reparative justice. Erik Yamamoto,
Sandra Kim, and Abigail Holden see international practice as a model of "remaking societal
understandings of who is worthy of redress" (Yamamoto et al. 2007: 74). David Gray writes that
the reparations must aim at new social and material conditions in order to "achieve a sustainable
new equilibrium among members of groups," and to situate victims "as individuals capable of
being wronged" (Gray 2010b, 1101-102). Pablo De Greiff argues that reparations must aim at
recognition of victims as bearers of rights, and at reestablishing trust between citizens and in their
institutions, based on confidence that shared values and norms are real and regarded as binding
on all (De Greiff 2006b ). In these views and others we see the beginning of a genuine project of
theorizing reparative justice, creating a field of contending approaches with potentially different
explanations of, and implications for, reparations practice.
My own view of reparations emphasizes the central but neglected role of hope (Walker 2006b).
Since reparations can only ever be particular measures or programs at particular times, they cannot
bear the whole weight of actually remaking understandings, bringing about a new equilibrium, or
establishing trust. They can only inspire a hopeful willingness for victims of injustice to believe in
and to try for better relationships, if others will struggle towards an understanding of past wrongs
and failed relationships, and accept the need for adequate gestures of amends for the past and
strong guarantees for the future that truly reflect an engagement among equals. If others become
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accountable-by actually accounting and making amends-then hope is reasonable, and it becomes
possible to seek equilibrium, build trust, and operate on a premise ofbasically respectful treatment.
Reorienting reparations to the issue of reconstructing relationships-socially, legally, and
economically-might in turn let us look more clearly at the real practical problems of reparations
rather than at a set of repetitive academic debates. The real problem is what I will call the
"reparations deficit."

The Reparations Deficit

Despite ever more refined and complex understandings of reparations that are reflected in the Basic
Principles, not much, and not much that is truly attuned to actual needs, perceptions, and desires
of victims of mass violence and injustice, is being done in the world in the way of reparations. The
main reparations deficit is that reparations are the least favored among measures that are seen as
"transitional justice." A recently published data-base on transitional justice measures around the
globe finds that financial reparations trail far behind either criminal trials or truth commissions;
all trail miserably behind some forms of amnesty-an official policy to just the close books and
move on (Olsen et al. 2010, Appendix 4). Ruben Carranza, Director of the Reparative Justice
Program of the International Center for Transitional Justice, comments: "Reparations are arguably
the most victim-centered of the various approaches to fighting impunity; but in recent years, most
of the international resources meant for transitional justice and peacebuilding has gone to operating
war crimes tribunals, occasionally to truth commissions, certainly to reintegrating ex-combatants,
but seldom, if ever, to directly benefit victims of human rights violations" (Carranza 2009: 4).
Reparations are a low priority domestically and internationally in both stable and transitional
societies. The other deficit is one within current practices of reparations. Victims of violence
and severe injustice who receive reparations receive little, have what they receive determined by
others, and receive what those others decide it is affordable or efficient to provide (see Johnston
and Slyomovics 2009 and Rubio-Marin 2009).
If we ask why reparations happen so infrequently, amount to so little, and often fail to engage
with actual needs and perspectives of the individuals and groups who seek justice, we need to
understand what is at stake in reparations struggles, and it is by no means only money. I have
suggested that restitution and compensation are often crucial instruments of reparations, but
they are not, as the corrective justice model would have it, what is exclusively at stake. It is a
renegotiation of relationship that reparations always symbolize and promise: they are an attempt
in the present to acknowledge and repudiate what happened before, and to begin a transformation
by attempting a first step, here and now, toward defining and creating relations of accountability
and reciprocity.
If a nation, institution, or group avoids making or refuses to make reparations in cases of gross
abuse or manifest histories of severe injustice, they hold themselves, even now as before, beyond
accountability to the people they have injured or whose mistreatment it falls to their society to
repair. They see themselves as having the power to refuse demands of justice from those who
deserve reparations. Since compelling calls for reparations come from those who have suffered
histories of injustice that have degraded their status socially and economically, or who have borne
the brunt of conflict because their economic or social vulnerability, they are generally not in a
strong position to compel the fulfillment of their claims. If a nation, institution, or group attempts
reparations without seeking to hear and understand the needs and perspectives of those who would
receive reparations then there is a failure of reciprocity. Those who would decide reparations based
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solely on their own perspective and assessment of what is due and what they are willing to offer,
reserve the right to decide for others rather than with them the nature and meaning of the victims'
losses. Even now as before, they do not show a willingness to meet the others on the ground of
shared standards and mutual responsibility.
Accountability and reciprocity are the basic terms of moral relationship, and they are what
reparations, whatever form they take, must try to signify. If a struggle for reparations begins to
engage, it is a medium for beginning to move forward toward a picture of what relationships
of accountability and reciprocity might look like where they have not existed before. Unlike an
exercise of corrective justice that "settles up" and closes the case, reparations open that passageway.
They are the beginning, not the end, of a different history. But they are only a beginning and it is
beyond the scope of reparations themselves to do more than exemplifY, through meaningful and
costly deeds, a promise to reconstruct relations; the achievement may take decades or generations
to secure. To understand the resistance within societies to negotiating in the present a mutual
understanding of just relations-taking responsibility for a shameful past and making uncertain but
hopeful commitments to a better future-is to appreciate what a remarkable, iffragile and limited,
achievement reparations are.
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